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North Korea
The Potential Application of Multi-Track Diplomacy to Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

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Introduction

The negotiated cease fire of 1953 between North Korea and United Nations forces began what no one at the time could have conceived: a 50 year period of unresolved, festering hostility between North Korea and much of the world, marked by occasional bouts of violence and terrorism, and in recent years by one of the worst famine disasters the modern world has ever seen. All throughout this period, the diplomatic tools of civilized humankind were available but unused, passively promulgating human suffering on a massive scale.

One can only wonder what difference it might have made to pursue diplomacy based on humanistic compassion when circumstances and opportunity were appropriate, rather than maintaining the unwavering confrontational stance used to restrain North Korea within its boundaries. Even today, little has changed: North Korea brandishes its only bargaining chip, development of nuclear weapons, in a belligerent but desperate effort to retain its national identity and feed its people. The United States in particular responds by insisting North Korea forebear nuclear weapons development prior to negotiations of any substance, a position seemingly designed to preserve the status quo and a lack of progress.

Traditional diplomacy, or discourse between governments or other representatives authorized to speak on behalf of a people, has a long history in the affairs of humankind, dating from the first tribal councils that met at harvest time far in the distant past. As people progressed through history, governments became more organized, roles became more formalized, and protocol became more elaborate. However, throughout time, the function of diplo-
macy has remained the same, that being to engage separate communities for the purpose of reaching a mutual accord for mutual benefit, whether that would be trade, dispute resolution, or any topic of common interest.

As the affairs of people became more complex, scholars recognized that traditional diplomacy between governments is not the only way peoples of separate societies interact for mutual benefit, and so depiction of the topic of diplomacy was expanded into nine separate tracks and the theory of multi-track diplomacy was born. This analysis will begin with a review of literature available on the topic; and continue with a brief history of the North Korean conflict; a description of the 1990s famine; a look at the history of NGO interaction with North Korea; and then will briefly describe the nine tracks of diplomacy, relate instances where each track has been used successfully, and briefly evaluate the potential of each of these tracks to be successfully employed to build peace with North Korea.
Literature Review

The primary reference for this analysis is the book, “Multi-track diplomacy” by Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald (1991/1996). For each of the described tracks of diplomacy, Diamond and McDonald give an introduction and definition; describe what they call the shape of the field, culture, activities, issues in the field, and place in the field; and lastly provide a list of resources which can be used if further study is desired. The book is descriptive in nature, and no effort is made to relate the tracks of diplomacy to actual case studies.

Jun-Taek Cha of American University submitted a Master’s thesis titled “An application of conflict resolution theory to peaceful reunification in the Korean peninsula” (Cha, 2000). Cha relates a history of the Korean conflict, which leads him to conclude that what he calls “the current power politics approach” has not been successful. He then analyzes three possible mechanisms for resolving the conflict, those being direct negotiation, mediation, and multi-track diplomacy.

Cha analyzes the numerous efforts that have been made by the two Koreas to reach a negotiated settlement over the years, but concludes that because the positions are so far apart, limited success in negotiation is all that can be expected. He explores the possibility of mediation to resolve the dispute, but concludes that the level of hostility is too high between the parties for mediation to be effective and that mediators do not exist that have adequate credibility with both sides.
Cha then briefly describes each of the nine tracks of diplomacy, relates the problems with the lack of effectiveness of Track One, and depicts possible common ground for success with several of the tracks. He concludes that Track Two: NGOs; Track Three: business; and Track Eight: funding, have the best potential for enacting a partial reunification of the Korean peninsula. Cha does a good job of laying framework for further analysis, but stops short of doing an in-depth analysis that would yield an executable policy strategy.

Don Oberdorfer (1997/2001) provides an excellent historical background that indicates the complexity of dealing with North Korea. Oberdorfer is uniquely qualified to provide such an account. His experience with Korea as a journalist began in 1953 shortly after the armistice, and has continued to the present. He has met Kim Il-Sung and most of the foreign ministers of North Korea, as well as all the modern rulers of South Korea. He also has discussed Korea policy with officials from the Department of State. He provides a detailed account of the Carter trip to North Korea in 1994 and the resultant Agreed Framework, one of the first accomplishments of semi-traditional diplomacy with North Korea.

Andrew Natsios (2001) depicts the famine that engulfed North Korea from about 1995 - 1998. Natsios wrote his account while serving as a Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, after having served as Vice President of World Vision and prior to entering his current position of Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. While at World Vision, he was involved in humanitarian initiatives to provide famine relief, and he also conducted interviews with refugees. Afterwards, he collected a body of evidence that analyzed what happened from political, economic,
diplomatic, and nongovernmental perspectives, and pieced together the complex web of cascading failures that resulted in one of the worst famines of the 20th century.

Editors L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (2003) pull together a collection of experiential case histories of NGOs that have worked with varying degrees of success with and in North Korea. The number of case histories is small. The history only begins at the approximate start of the famine in 1995. Flake and Snyder divide the experience into three components: the U.S. experience, the European experience, and the South Korean experience. These perspectives provide evidence of which international parties might have the most credibility and therefore be the most successful in interacting with North Korea in the future.
A Brief History

Oberdorfer depicts how Korea was divided into North and South by agreement between the Soviet Union and the West at the end of World War II. The Korean people did not provide their input in this decision. Therefore, the stated goal of both North and South was reunification—although under vastly different terms. The South passively sought to reconcile the split through nonviolent interaction. In contrast, the North planned from the beginning to forcibly reunite the country by military means, and invaded the South in 1950 to enact this plan. By the time the cease-fire was signed, 900,000 Chinese, 520,000 North Koreans, and 400,000 United Nations people were dead.

North Korea was then barricaded but not defeated, and its reunification policy remained unchanged. In the meantime, South Korea struggled with its own identity and concept of national leadership, enduring several dictatorial regimes, coup attempts, and sporadic population unrest until around the mid-1980s, when a democratic form of government finally took hold. Throughout, North Korea sought by means of terrorism, assassination, and sabotage to undermine the stability of the South in support of the North's reunification policy.

In the years immediately following the divide, the economy of North Korea performed better than the economy of South Korea. This was due to the North being primarily industrial, and the South being primarily agricultural. However, from the beginning, the North was heavily dependent on both the Soviet Union and China for trade and military support. As the years went by, North Korea
underwent—from its perspective—betrayal after betrayal from its partners. China came to the realization that the centrally planned economy which was a cornerstone of the socialist revolution didn’t work, and so over time transitioned to a market economy. Upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, monetary, produce, and military support to North Korea slowed and finally stopped, creating a devastating economic impact. North Korea’s ideological comrades, China and Russia, further broke from the fold by diplomatically recognizing South Korea, which both had sworn never to do. By the year 1992, nearly all vestiges of the old ideology were gone—save in North Korea, which did not at the time realize the decisions it was making would result in the tragedies that were to unfold.

The Famine

The famine itself began with a series of underproductive harvests in the North beginning around 1990. These may have been exacerbated by weather and floods as the North claimed, but a significant contribution to the problem was over-fertilization and other poor farming practices that were components of the socialist ideology and were never changed. There is also speculation that in the years 1990–1994, North Korea’s leader Kim Il-Sung was suffering from such poor eyesight that he had official reports such as agriculture reports read to him by his son Kim Jong-Il, who continued to paint the economy in rosy terms. Kim Il-Sung may not have found out about the extent of the food shortage problems until 1993 or 1994. He died in 1994, shortly after committing to the Agreed Framework, which dealt more with the North’s nuclear program and energy
needs than food needs, and before he could take any meaningful action to resolve the food shortage situation. With his death, the leadership of North Korea became murky and ineffectual for a period of time, until Kim Jong-Il was able to consolidate his power and become the country’s unchallenged leader. However, Kim Jong-Il attained his power through alliance with the military, giving economic concerns secondary consideration, if any, and far too late. Thus, all the swirling factors came together in 1995—failed ideology, failed international policy, failed harvests, failed leadership—and the famine roared through North Korea like a tidal wave.

Natsios relates that once food shortages became a reality, North Korea began a very logical program of rationing. However, as the food shortage became critical, rations were cut far below subsistence levels. Food was already distributed by a complex priority system, favoring the power elite, farmers, and miners first, and others in descending priority. To deal with the shortage, rations were first cut incrementally to match the supply availability, and then portions of the country were simply cut off from distribution. To cope, farmer’s markets sprang up everywhere, as the official distribution system was bypassed on a wholesale manner. Refugees fled the country en mass. Factories were looted of equipment which was sold for food, killing off significant segments of industry.

Hungry people quickly lost their socialist ideology. When the rations to farmers were cut, the farmers began illegal hoarding, illegal pre-harvesting—harvesting prior to the official government harvest which was largely confiscated—installed secret family farms, and even went so far as to plant seed under the watchful eye of the government, only to return later to dig up the planted seed and eat
it, effectively liquidating that year’s harvest. The worst of human
nature came to pass. Entire families would commit suicide together.
Bands of orphan children roamed city streets looking to steal food.
Human trafficking of women and children was rampant. Official
food policy eventually changed, but not necessarily for the better:
ultimately, each family was given responsibility for feeding itself.
The market economy in North Korea was born and officially
sanctioned, at least for that time period. Over time, the market
economy, emigration, and famine deaths resulted in equilibrium,
and death from famine had effectively ended by 1998 or 1999. By
then, the famine had killed—and estimates vary widely due to data
that cannot be validated—between 600,000 and three and a half
million people of a population of 22 million. This is the equivalent
to having conducted a second Korean War.
NGO Involvement in North Korea

The Carter Visit

Initiatives to interact with North Korea in a semi-official or private citizen/private organization capacity only began around 1994. The most well known of these is the visit by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which defused a very high tension situation and resulted in the development and signing of the Agreed Framework which outlined the relationship between North Korea and the West for several years.

Oberdorfer is not kind to the diplomatic policies and capabilities of the Clinton administration in his description of the buildup to the Carter visit. He describes the administration as inept, its relations with South Korea and China as disastrously naïve, and internal foreign policy decision-making as utterly divided, with the result being that in 1994 the world almost went to war over North Korea’s nuclear development program.

When Jimmy Carter entered the picture, his involvement wasn’t a popular idea. Never a popular president with Washington insiders during his own presidency, it was not felt that he had anything to offer to the ongoing process. However, President Clinton was desperate. His advisors had painted alternative U.S. strategies to the nuclear crisis, incorporated projected international and North Korean responses, and all of the scenarios led to war. The prognosis was grim: Clinton was briefed that U.S. casualties could reach 52,000; South Korean casualties 500,000; uncountable North Ko-
The Clinton administration recognized the criticality of achieving a diplomatic solution, but had no knight in shining armor who could serve as an acceptable go-between with North Korea. North Korea had rejected discussions with Senators Nunn and Lugar. When former President Carter called President Clinton to voice his concerns over the crisis, he basically fell into the savior role due to his work as an intermediary elsewhere, and because of the fact he had previously been invited to visit North Korea by Kim Il-Sung.

Carter announced unilaterally that he intended to visit North Korea as a private citizen. He asked for and received talking points on the official position of the U.S. government to use in discussions with the North. He was not opposed by the Clinton administration, but his trip was viewed with hostility by South Korea. Undeterred, Carter and his wife passed through the demilitarized zone and met with Kim Il-Sung. Carter found the North Korean leader to be rational and reasonable, in sharp contrast to his portrayal by the outside world. Kim wanted security and electricity—food aid was not yet on his radar—and was willing to bargain away his nuclear program to acquire them. Carter recognized the potential for a breakthrough and began to work out the details. However, as it was ongoing, his bargaining was generating extreme skepticism in Washington. Some went so far as to call his deal-making “near traitorous.” Carter, however, then proceeded to trump the entire U.S. foreign policy machine by conducting an interview live on CNN in which he announced to the world that a breakthrough had been achieved and tensions had been defused. The Clinton administration, not knowing whether to laugh or cry, ultimately acquiesced to the Carter plan. However, as Oberdorfer
relates, “the former president was startled to be privately informed when he came back across the DMZ that the White House did not want him to return home through Washington or to even make a phone call report to Clinton.”

Thus was played out an episode that clearly portrays the old axiom that no good deed ever goes unpunished. The world community wanted to avert war: Jimmy Carter averted war. However, the cost to Carter in terms of his reputation and political influence in the U.S. was extremely high. As almost a historical footnote, Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002; however, because there never was any political will in the West to carry out the provisions of the Agreed Framework, North Korea withdrew from the accord two months after the Nobel Prize was awarded, which was presumably timed to embarrass Carter for the failure.

There are valuable if not necessarily positive insights to be gained from this episode. First, citizen diplomacy can contrast sharply from official diplomacy in acceptance and credibility. Citizen diplomacy can be conducted contrary to official diplomacy, and when this is the case, official government support of the citizen diplomat’s efforts will probably be lacking. On the other hand, in this case the results achieved by one private citizen were extraordinary, and accomplished something that an entire international community did not and probably could not have achieved, which speaks well to sheer effectiveness.
Flake (2003) depicts the difficulty of interaction that NGOs encountered when they began to respond to North Korean food aid requests in 1995. The difference in perception of the situation and the sheer culture shock of dealing with each other was profound. To the North Koreans, the problem was simple: they had a food distribution system that was empty and required filling. The food was welcome, associated distribution personnel were not. To the NGOs, more used to working in unstructured Africa, the problem was complex: food shortages were symptoms of dysfunctional agriculture and distribution systems that could be improved; the extent of the food shortage must be independently verified prior to aid being given; food donations are gifts from donor organizations and countries that insist that the effectiveness of the donation be verified; and policies were in place that mandated food distribution on a most-needy-first basis. The NGOs went in thinking they knew how to run an effective food aid program and that North Korea would allow them to do so.

It didn’t work out that way. One of the very first hurdles encountered was that North Koreans had no concept of what an NGO was. As every North Korean citizen has an allegiance to his government and nothing else, the notion that organizations existed that were, for example, funded by the U.S. but independent of U.S. government policy was nonsensical. Accordingly, the first NGO personnel to arrive in North Korea were regarded as enemy operatives and spies. It didn’t get any better when the NGO personnel described their requirements — independent verification of the food shortage, delivery verification, analysis of the agriculture system, and so forth. For the entire length of time that U.S. NGOs operated
in North Korea—most had pulled out by 1999—North Korea never once acceded to any of these requirements.

The complex nature of NGOs contributed to the problem. The fact is, many NGOs are contracted by the U.S. government to distribute aid, and so their independence is compromised by this very feature. Other NGOs do not have government contracts, but given that the North Koreans did not understand the NGO concept in the first place, this distinction was too subtle to be initially communicated. There were and are U.S. NGOs that achieved success working in North Korea, but they are the ones without U.S. government contracts and typically Christian funded, that were willing to stay for the long haul without making too many demands, and who found a unique capability to provide. For example, the Nautilus Institute was able to establish a wind power generation project which supplies all necessary electricity for the village of Unha-ri. However, this example is the exception, and most U.S. NGOs, once the food distribution system was filled to North Korean satisfaction, found that visas to enter the country became harder and harder to obtain until they just gave up.

**European NGO experience in North Korea**

Michael Schloms (2003) relates the experience of European NGOs and Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs), which differs from the experience of U.S. NGOs significantly. All NGOs report the same resistance to data gathering and communication with North Korean citizens. All report crippling problems with access to and movement within the country. As stated earlier, portions of the country, specifically the northeast region, were cut off from the central food distribution network early in the famine.
Similarly, North Korea absolutely prohibits any agency from working in the northeast, even though there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the northeast required the most help. To this date, no organization has ever been granted access to this region.

European NGOs and IGOs were divided on how to deal with North Korean restrictions. Significantly, Medicins du Monde, Medicins Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders), Action Contra le Faim, and OXFAM, large established organizations that are well respected worldwide, chose to pull out rather than accede to North Korean restrictions. Others chose to stay despite the restrictions, feeling that any aid provided was worth the effort even if distribution was less than ideal and verification was nonexistent. This largely mirrors governmental discussions about North Korea as well, as some countries take the position that North Korea must make concessions to receive aid, while others feel it would be immoral to not provide aid knowing the critical need.

Those who chose to stay made inroads in their relationships with North Korea, although the process was slow and painful and confounded by innumerable setbacks. As noted, North Korea’s only priority in the beginning was obtaining food, while a critical NGO priority was improvement of the agriculture system. Over time, the North Koreans began to realize the value of what the NGOs were trying to teach, and opened the discourse slightly to include agricultural improvements. The most significant impact of this is that North Korea now plants both a summer and a winter crop, nearly doubling output of its agricultural process. The other significant note is that the relationship between European NGOs and North Korea is ongoing to date. Though both sides are somewhat dissatis-
fied with the relationship, both recognize its value, and so it continues.

South Korean NGO experience in North Korea

Chung Oknim (2003) depicts the relationship between South Korean NGOs and North Korea, which is again markedly different from the U.S. and European experiences. Whereas it may be arguable that the U.S. government surreptitiously hoped that involvement of NGOs in North Korea would destabilize the government, and that European NGOs hoped that agriculture reform might also bring about governmental reform, South Korean aid was given predominately due to a sympathetic response of Koreans wanting to help fellow Koreans. Typically, aid would have no strings attached, making acceptance easier for the North to deal with.

Beginning the process was difficult, however. Both North and South Korea had laws prohibiting contact with the other which had to be changed. South Korea had to overcome the North Korean perception that their workers were spies, which they did by channeling deliveries through the International Red Cross. At first, there was considerable resistance among the conservative power elite in the South to permitting the provision of aid, and so aid from the South started slowly. However, once the South Korean administration changed and new President Kim Dae-Jung announced his “Sunshine Policy” for dealing with North Korea, different agencies within the South Korean government actually began to compete with each other to see who could provide the most aid, which had the effect of pushing the NGOs aside and overwhelming the distribution system.
South Korean NGOs also were able to accomplish inroads in areas that others were not, moving from provision of food into ongoing agriculture reform and reform of the medical system, which in North Korea had not progressed beyond 1960s technology. This relationship is ongoing and continues to grow, despite the fact the Sunshine Policy fell out of favor and tensions between North Korea and the world have risen once again. The willingness of North Korea to accept agricultural and medical reform from South Korea is probably the most profound change to its traditional system of isolated self-reliance.
The Nine Tracks of Diplomacy

Track One Diplomacy: Government

Track One Overview

In the vernacular of political science, diplomacy is viewed as one of the instruments of foreign policy, taking its place alongside the military instrument, the economic instrument, and so on. The activities and capabilities of these instruments, put together, form the foreign policy of the nation-state. In the United States, traditional diplomacy is viewed as being predominate, being the first choice in dealing with other nations. Thus, the U.S. will first typically establish a diplomatic mission with other countries and conduct foreign policy activities at the formal level for as long as that is effective in achieving U.S. objectives. When diplomacy is ineffective at fully achieving U.S. objectives, the economic instrument will be used, typically in the form of tariffs and sanctions, and if that is ineffective, then the military instrument will be used, typically using in sequential progression intimidation, occupation, and finally war.

The diplomatic strategy of the United States has become increasingly complex in recent times. In the past, the U.S. typically acted alone in its foreign policy decisions, enacting economic sanctions and even invasions, such as those of Grenada and Panama (among others), unilaterally as deemed necessary. However, as this is obviously contrary to the concept of the United Nations, which was formed to diplomatically resolve conflict without the military instrument being necessary, the United States has been constrained to go to great lengths to obtain diplomatic approval from the United
Nations prior to engaging in military action. The United States has also found it necessary to conduct extensive diplomacy at times prior to enacting economic sanctions, since the advent of the European Union, the formation of OPEC, and the arrival of China as an economic power have made U.S. economic sanctions much less potent than they once were. Accordingly, U.S. diplomats are finding that they need to be diplomatic rather than prescriptive in the era of modern foreign policy, which has arguably been difficult for some U.S. administrations to conceptualize, and is not well understood yet by the American people. Superpower status is deeply ingrained in the American psyche, and the notion of being first among equals or even one among equals would be a difficult paradigm shift to undergo if that were to indeed be the future of the United States.

**Track One Success (and Failure) Stories**

The United States’ brand of diplomacy is unique now among diplomatic styles of the world because of the U.S. status as the world’s only superpower, meaning that the diplomatic arm of foreign power has the most powerful military arm in the world to back it up. This can be good and bad, effective and ineffective. Unquestionably the powerful military arm of the U.S. deterred Soviet and Chinese expansionism during the Cold War era, but on the other hand has been useless in deterring Somali warlords and Islamic terrorists.

In the case of the Cold War, diplomacy was effective by being consistent—the policy of maintaining current borders of existing nation-states never changed, and eventually as the Soviets
came to recognize that there was no threat to their state inherent in this policy, policies of openness such as glasnost were enabled, which led to economic reform and the return of occupied states to self rule. In the case of China, the diplomatic dispute is not resolved, as Taiwan is viewed by the West as a separate nation, and viewed by China as a breakaway province. Traditional diplomacy has limited effectiveness in the case of intractable positions.

Somalia and Islamic fundamentalism are examples of the most glaring shortfall of traditional Track One diplomacy: interaction and engagement with an entity not represented by a recognized government, in political science terms called a “non-state actor.” One underlying assumption which enables Track One diplomacy is that every nation-state is represented by a central government, and that central government effectively represents the will of its citizens. This concept has critical shortfalls, particularly in Africa where the nation-state concept has been ineffective and dysfunctional; and in the Islamic world, which tends to view the nation-state concept as unnecessary, preferring a loose theocracy and/or tribal council as the only government, and having had to endure western-imposed autocracies throughout the industrial era, which were created solely for the sake of forming nation-states.

Nonetheless, traditional Track One diplomacy has been successful throughout history at bringing together societies for mutual benefit. The greatest success story is the formation of the United Nations (U.N.), which now includes 191 nations, formed to resolve conflict, to enable trade, and to share culture. The U.N. has evolved over the past half century to the extent that it now is involved in the areas of peace and security, economic and social development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, and international law. Utiliz-
ing an organizational structure comprised of a General Assembly, an Economic and Social Council, a Security Council, and an International Court of Justice, the U.N. works diplomatically to further the concepts of civilization worldwide (United Nations, 2003-2004). With its work in encouraging education, battling disease, peacekeeping, economic development, and the myriad of other activities it is involved with, the U.N. is arguably the best representation of the diplomatic success achieved by humankind as a whole.

**Track One as Applied to North Korea**

Traditional diplomacy in the case of North Korea is both a resounding success and a dismal failure, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. The United States would view it as a success, citing the fact that the negotiated cease-fire of the 1950s, backed by United Nations forces and economic sanctions by the world community, has prevented North Korea from reuniting the Korean peninsula under dictatorial rule for nearly 60 years. Yet diplomacy has been a dismal failure for exactly these same reasons. During the period beginning around 1995, these sanctions and military blockades, combined with a severe drought, have resulted in the starvation of an estimated 600,000 to 3.5 million North Korean citizens, depending on the estimate being used, of a total population of 22 million (Institute For International Economics, 2003). The issue is permeated with horror stories, and the impacts are well understood in the international community, yet diplomacy has been absolutely ineffective in easing the plight of the North Korean people. The latest diplomatic initiative, involving North and South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia is focused almost exclusively on preventing North Korea from becoming a nuclear
power, which has little or nothing to do with the feeding of the North Korean people.

This issue, the interaction of North Korea with the outside world, serves well to show the shortfalls of traditional Track One diplomacy. To resolve this issue, it seems clear that a more comprehensive, systems view encompassing the other diplomatic tracks will be necessary to enable a solution of mutual benefit and ease the suffering of the North Korean people.

**Track Two Diplomacy: Non-governmental Organizations**

**Track Two Overview**

Track Two diplomacy was borne of the recognition that Track One did not fulfill all of humanity’s needs for diplomatic interaction. By comparison, Track Two is unofficial, informal, and introspective in its examination of a conflict or other issue. For this reason, Track Two generates a freedom of interaction that is not possible in the formal setting of traditional diplomacy. Track Two also fills a void — Track One is weak in such activities as citizenship building, microfinance of small business in developing nations, disease prevention, education, and a host of other beneficial support activities. Additionally, there are many parts of the world where formal governments, both foreign and one’s own, are held in deep suspicion due to histories of oppressive behaviors and corruption, and Track Two organizations come in without the burden of that stigma. Accordingly, doors are open that would not be otherwise, and effectiveness is greatly enhanced.
Track Two diplomats are often skilled professionals who bring great knowledge of societal building and win-win negotiation to the situation. They tend to view the world as a complex system available to be improved through empowerment of the individual. In this way, they generate the respect of those they deal with, with the result being an end product or situation that is often superior to a negotiated one. Track Two practitioners are also typically humanitarian by nature and intent, bringing a humanistic perspective to diplomacy that is lacking in formal government relations.

Track Two Success Stories

One of the most respected U. S. organizations practicing Track Two diplomacy is the Carter Center, formed in 1987 by former president Jimmy Carter in response to what he saw as a need in United States interactions with the international community for this type of organization (Carter Center, 2002). The Carter Center operates a peace program, further divided into an Americas program, conflict resolution program, democracy program, global development initiative, and human rights initiatives. The center also operates a health program, battling such diseases as Guinea worm, river blindness, and trachoma, among others. As one example, in 1995 the Carter Center began working with governments in Africa to effect the repatriation of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees. Through two years of extensive negotiation and despite numerous setbacks, most of these refugees were in their home country by 1997.

The Carter Center is one example of a multitude of nongovernmental and professional organizations that practice Type Two diplomacy throughout the world. Organizations such as Doctors without Borders, CARE, RedR, Oxfam, and Amnesty Interna-
tional fill crucial requirements that formal governments cannot, enabling the best in human interaction to come forward.

Track Two as Might (Further) be Applied to North Korea

Track Two diplomacy has been underway in North Korea for some time in very limited measure, as related earlier. Again using the Carter Center as an example, in June 1994 Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter became the first people to cross the demilitarized zone and back since it was established in the 1950s. The result of the Carters’ diplomatic efforts was the agreement with then North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. Subsequently, the Carter Center worked to improve agriculture in North Korea, involving additional agencies such as Adventist Development and Relief, Amigos Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Korean American Sharing Movement, and Mercy Corps International (Carter Center, 2002). This success story stands in sharp contrast to the recent results of Track One diplomacy with North Korea, which has seen formal relations degenerate to the point that North Korea has since renounced the nuclear freeze agreement.

Given the stark contrast between the success of Track Two diplomacy and the intractable stances leading to humanitarian disasters that have been the fruit of Track One diplomacy with North Korea, it is clear that more initiative and focus on Track Two might have better success in solving the serious humanitarian issues North Korea faces, and deserves more attention and research.
Track Three Diplomacy: Business

Track Three Overview

Joint business ventures, undertaken for the mutual benefit of multiple parties utilizing substantive contributions from each, have existed throughout history. Although Diamond and McDonald assert that most businesses do not view themselves as having anything to do with peace, the fact is that negotiations concerning money, resources, and labor always require diplomacy, and so the diplomatic efforts of international businesses as they open new ventures are de facto peace negotiations.

Track Three has great power to effect change. Discovery of an oil field, the opening of a manufacturing plant in an impoverished country, or the enactment of a joint trade agreement can often bring transformation that will impact entire populations. There is great potential for good: new industry and new opportunities usually bring an improved standard of living, with associated benefits to health, education, nutrition and the quality of life in general. However, there are pitfalls: ventures concerned primarily with profits and profiteering have destroyed environments, left populations impoverished, and provided little in the way of social advancement. Another significant pitfall is friction between business and government. Occasionally, a cooperative business initiative which has the potential to benefit great numbers of people is thwarted by protectionist government policies such as tariffs and subsidies. One good example of this would be the ongoing dispute over U.S. coffee and sugar subsidies, which have prevented numerous developing nations from competitively entering the world market.
Track Three Success Stories

The best examples of Track Three success stories are the nations of Germany and Japan. In 1945, both nations lay in rubble in the aftermath of World War II. Due to the economic rebuilding of these countries under the Marshall Plan, they were able to build themselves into world economic powers. As of 2003, data show per capita incomes of $27,600 for Germany, the fifth largest economy in the world, and $28,000 for Japan, the third largest economy in the world (CIA, 2004). Although the Marshall Plan was put in place by Track One diplomats, it was enabled and executed by Track Three businesses, creating resounding success stories and prime examples for emulation.

Track Three as Might be Applied to North Korea

Business investment is occurring in North Korea, although all investment is under central government approval and control which is greatly restrictive. Companies have been formed to be enablers or catalysts for business with North Korea, and are establishing track records, credibility, and success stories. One such company, Koreastrategic Inc., offers tips for doing business and guides businessmen in negotiations with North Korea, with a dossier of ten years experience (Koreastrategic, 2001). Koreastrategic reports the hottest business commodity in North Korea is currently telecommunications. As an additional example, the BBC reports that market reform is underway in North Korea, with subsidies withdrawn from state-owned firms, laborers being paid by how much they produce, and legalization of farmer’s markets, which are
important steps needed to encourage market reform and capital investment (Jones, 2004).

These are fledgling initiatives. However, North Korean government and citizens, like the rest of the world, respond to profit motives, and so well managed, socially conscious investments in North Korea have great potential for improving the plight of the North Korean people.

*Track Four Diplomacy: Private Citizens*

*Track Four Overview*

Citizen diplomacy, Track Four, is the most grassroots of all the diplomatic tracks. Formed by any interested individual or group, to advocate any topic or discussion of interest, individuals and small groups initiate discourse in the absence of formality, protocol, or even government sanction. Topics pursued by the citizen diplomat might include such areas as cultural exchange, health awareness, religion, environmentalism, or education. Groups might interact for the purpose of cross-cultural training, business ventures, or student exchange, among many others.

Track Four as an entity has no formal organization, guiding principles, or common cause. It has no dedicated funding or government oversight. As an instrument of national power and influence, one could rationally conclude that it does not exist. And yet, the diplomacy enacted by private citizens has profound positive impacts on the human condition.
Track Four Success Stories

One coordinating agency for Track Four diplomats is the American Council for Voluntary International Action, or InterAction. InterAction has over 160 member organizations operating in developing countries, working to eradicate poverty and provide social justice for all peoples (InterAction, 2002). InterAction members have responded to emergency situations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Chad, Liberia, and Iraq, among others. InterAction offers pathways for individuals to work on a volunteer basis in such organizations as World Relief, the Red Cross, and the Church World Service, among others.

Success stories are as numerous as citizen diplomats, numbering in the millions. Each participant has an experience to share that illustrates the impact of their work on the population they have served. The organization Volunteers for Peace International specializes in arranging camp placements for volunteers worldwide (Volunteers for Peace, n.d.). Following are quotes from participants who have changed lives, and had their lives changed as well:

“I believe that in the short time of the camp, substantial good was accomplished. The infrastructure improvements to the village, though not glamorous, were tangible and immediately usable. And the 53 people with restored vision in one eye will lead fuller and more productive lives as a result of the eye camp. This made the experience a highly rewarding one. It was also a unique way of learning about rural life in this friendly country.” Volunteer to Bangladesh, 2001

“I really enjoyed my experience in Africa; however, it was a new experience for me and I don’t believe I expected to be quite so
emotionally drained or frustrated by everything I saw that I simply could not change. I was the youngest volunteer they had ever had being 18, but there are no age limits on cultural understanding. Overall, the contacts and friendships I made were incredible, as well as the amazing exposure to the culture and lifestyle of Africa, and I would recommend this camp to an emotionally strong person who is able to be independent and adapt to new environments relatively easily.” Volunteer to Togo, 2001

Individually, participants such as these may not have a profound impact on a large scale, but collectively, all of these individual efforts and experiences can shape the attitude of citizens towards the governments of the benefactors, enabling formal Track One relations to benefit and become more effective as a result. The pitfall would be if the Track Four diplomat and the Track One diplomat were sending different messages, a situation referenced by Diamond and McDonald. In this case, the effectiveness of the citizen diplomat might actually serve to undermine the credibility and foreign policy objectives of his/her government.

Track Four as Might be Applied to North Korea

The interaction of Track Four citizen diplomats with North Korea is largely unexplored territory. A review of websites of organizations that place volunteers worldwide failed to reveal any that place volunteers in North Korea. NK Missions, an organization dedicated to providing religious teachings to North Korean citizens once North Korea opens to the outside world, has made no inroads into the country itself (NK Missions, n.d.). Doctors without Borders was able to work in North Korea from 1995 to 1998, but withdrew when access to citizens in need became too difficult (Doctors without
Borders, 2003). Even recognizing the difficulties entering and operating in the country given the recurring, documented humanitarian crises experienced by North Korea, there is a need for further exploration of citizen diplomacy, which could potentially address a glaring unmet requirement, and clearly deserves further study.

**Track Five Diplomacy: Research, Training, and Education**

**Track Five Overview**

It is perhaps unique among the tracks of diplomacy that even when states are in deep conflict bordering on war, exchange of scholars to enable mutual learning often continues. For example, the Fulbright visiting scholar program has operated in Russia for more than thirty years, and throughout much of the Cold War period (Fulbright Exchange Program, n.d.). Scholarship and learning are the most likely form of interchange to be politically neutral, and the most likely to clearly benefit both parties in every interaction. Because of this, scholars have had what amounts to a ‘diplomatic immunity’ in carrying out scholarly exchange.

Diamond and McDonald draw a sharp distinction between two types of Track Five subsystems. The first they describe as “think tanks”, professional scholars brought together to solve problems, forecast the future of events, and so on. Think tanks often sponsor international conferences, do directed research on specific issues, and are sometimes part of a consulting support base for government. The second type of Track Five entity is the student, be it K-12, college, or university. Students are viewed as more freeform and creative, not directed at a solution and less influenced by prevailing cultural norms. To quote Diamond and McDonald: “This is a
particularly vibrant component of the Multi-Track Diplomacy community. Intellectual ferment and creativity are flourishing; students are pouring into study programs. This is the community from which much of the conflict resolution theory and practice is coming; this is where the exciting and often revolutionary learning for children of all ages is happening."

Track Five Success Stories

There is perhaps no other diplomatic component that has more potential of making a globe-saving transformation than education. Every drop of education is important, and seemingly irrelevant increments of education can have startling results. For example, the Brookings Institution found that in Africa, a child born to an uneducated mother has a 20% chance of dying by age five: if born to an educated mother, this drops to 12% (Sperling, 2003). In Brazil, illiterate mothers have on average six children: literate mothers between two and three. Studies indicate that every additional year of education increases the wages of workers in poor countries by 10 to 20%. Advanced education likewise produces advanced results. Advances in food production and disease control are now developed and refined by international teams of scholars who check and validate each other’s work. These components of the global community, more than any other, have the potential to eventually wipe out disease and starvation.

As positive as this may sound, there is one significant caveat worthy of note. Education, particularly children’s education, is only as good as the material presented. The Hebrew University makes an important point in this regard. In 1979, they participated in a group that negotiated the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty components re-
garding culture, science, and education (Averini, 2003). Following World War Two, the French and Germans held a similar discourse for the purpose of getting past issues of cultural hatred and to enable healing. As part of this successful initiative, they formed a textbook commission, dedicated to replacing traditional nationalist narratives with a more balanced, historically correct perspective. Averini and his group, representing the Israelis, expected the Egyptian delegation to welcome this idea.

The Egyptians refused, arguing that allowing a third party to influence the content of textbooks would be an affront to their sovereignty. The committee was never formed, and Egypt continued to use textbooks with a nationalist perspective. Unfortunately, these texts are to this day imbedded with anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment, and so children grow up understanding that dislike, even hatred of Israel and the West is right and proper. As Averini states, “Mohammed Atta first learned to hate the U.S. in Egyptian schools and from Egypt’s state-controlled media.” This led to tragic results on September 11, 2001, as we know. If educational inroads are ever made into North Korea, this issue of balanced education will be significant.

**Track Five as Might be Applied to North Korea**

Scholarly exchange with North Korea has been extremely limited to date, with the possible of exception of exchange between North Korea and China or Russia, for which data are not readily available. As an example of scholarly exchange between North Korea and the United States, the University of Missouri in 2001 hosted two delegations of North Korean agricultural scholars, and has sent two professors to North Korea to conduct training there
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(MU International, 2001). There was, as might be expected, high level government participation on the North Korean side, with both delegations being led by the Ministry of Agriculture. To date, the visible exchange with North Korea has occurred when North Korea needs something. Scholars came to the University of Missouri specifically to improve food production back home. Cultural exchange in the arts and humanities is as yet unknown, but possible. North Korea is a proud culture, and might be approachable by contingents of scholars that were respectful of Korean heritage. There is limited room for exploration of this avenue at the present time, but more may be possible in the future.

*Track Six Diplomacy: Activism*

**Track Six Overview**

Diamond and McDonald relate that “The primary task of the activist community is to change institutions, attitudes, and policies through political action.” There are large and significant differences in the perception of activism depending on whether it is viewed through a democratic or totalitarian lens. Democracies tend to view activism as a right possessed by citizens to enable all people to express their views in a public forum, so long as civic order is maintained and the rule of law is followed. Totalitarian societies tend to view activism as subversion to authority bordering on treason, and as a result, activism is typically dealt with very harshly. This polarity is significant, because if one is analyzing a situation to determine which of the tracks of diplomacy would be most effective in achieving a desired result, the projected response to the use of activism should be considered.
For people passionate about their cause, activism is often viewed as the only outlet, regardless of circumstance. Accordingly, there are times when activism leads to loss of freedom and even loss of life. Activism is the track of diplomacy most likely to be taken to an extreme, as it suffers from lack of authority, credibility, and recognition by governments and organizations in power. This generates a frustration that frequently will escalate protests to violence. Suicide bombers are the modern world’s ultimate activists. Recognizing this, there appears to be an unmet need for an outlet or political process that would be more effective in dealing with activist causes and would forestall the ultimate protest.

**Track Six Success Stories**

In the American psyche, the most well known activist cause was the Vietnam War. Deeply divided on the issue from the beginning, the questionable motive for the war and the failure to attain a victory quickly galvanized the protest movement nationwide, particularly on college campuses, and fueled a period of protests and often riots that spanned several years. Ultimately, the U.S. political administration decided to withdraw from Vietnam, even at the cost of significant embarrassment on the world stage and declining influence and prestige in the world. This outcome has always been seen by activists of the time as a victory for their cause.

Elsewhere in the world, activist causes that claim success include Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaign against the British in India; Russian protests that protected the Yeltsin regime from a hardliner coup; the Georgian Revolution of the Roses; and the Iranian revolution that deposed the government of the Shah of Iran.
Tirman (1999), writing in “The Nation,” argues that peace activism played a role in ending the cold war. He asserts that even during the Reagan presidency, when official rhetoric was labeling the Soviet Union as an evil empire, activist groups were working hard to communicate to the Soviets that U.S. ballistic missile intentions were purely defensive, and to communicate to the U.S. that Soviet desire for arms reduction was genuine. Although not widely publicized or recognized in the overall body of literature dealing with the cold war, Tirman’s claim of credit for the peace activist movement is persuasive.

**Track Six as Might be Applied to North Korea**

North Korea is a totalitarian state. Accordingly, of the nine tracks of diplomacy, activism would be viewed as the one which is the ‘sworn enemy’ of the state and its people, and activists within North Korea could be expected to be dealt with harshly. As a selected strategy for improving North Korea’s circumstance in the world, activism would probably be the diplomatic track whose time has not yet come.

This is not to say there is no activism associated with North Korea. Amnesty International has an extended history of publishing information on North Korea, primarily with the intent of documenting human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2004). Writing in 2004, Amnesty relates that there is no direct access to data collection within North Korea, and that data are therefore obtained through testimony of refugees and NGOs working in the area. Amnesty carefully documents issues of food shortages, malnutrition, corruption in the food distribution system, and instances of public capital punishment, citing in each instance which treaty or
agreement is held in violation. This is valuable information about North Korea, but unlikely to be an influence on North Korea, due to North Korean citizens having nonexistent access to the world media.

*Track Seven Diplomacy: Religion*

*Track Seven Overview*

Religious diplomacy, or “faith in action”, is an effort by the worldwide religious community of many denominations to teach (or remind) people of the world that religion and belief systems are founded on peace and love rather than violence and war. Diamond and McDonald sampled a list of eleven faith based groups involved in peace activism. Of these, eight are Christian, one is Jewish, one is Buddhist, and one is Hindu. This would seem to indicate the authors consider Track Seven to be a Christian construct, which would limit its effectiveness in much of the world. They make no effort to quantify or analyze faith based diplomatic organizations from the Muslim or Confucian world. This is a significant omission, as it would be natural to assume that Christian initiatives would generate a less enthusiastic response in the Confucian world, and vice versa. As it is, Christian missionaries have at times been harassed or even arrested under suspicion of trying to convert Muslims to Christianity. Practitioners of religious diplomacy must walk a fine line at times.

*Track Seven Success Stories*

Like Track Four citizen diplomacy success stories, Track Seven successes are not measured in terms of overthrow of govern-
ments or changes in national policy. Rather, they are the success stories of person-to-person interaction that brings goodwill and understanding to the parties involved.

**Track Seven as Might be Applied to North Korea**

This is unexplored territory at the present time. The aforementioned NK Missions is a Christian group poised on the outside of North Korea looking in, and standing ready to provide Christian ministry to North Korea should the country open its borders. However, research did not indicate any missionary groups currently working in North Korea. Further, North Korea is primarily Confucian in belief, and the lack of information on Confucian ministries, if such ministries exist, limits understanding of the potential of this area.

**Track Eight Diplomacy: Funding**

**Track Eight Overview**

Track Eight diplomats are the philanthropists of the world. Often these are private individuals or foundations, but also included are such agencies as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and like-chartered organizations. As a whole, they energize programs throughout the world which advance the cause of civilization and economic development, as well as provide support for health programs and other vital initiatives. No area is particularly off limits, and the causes supported are as varied as the supporters.
Recent individual initiatives have included Turner Broadcasting founder Ted Turner pledging a billion dollars to the United Nations to advance the cause of civilization worldwide, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates pledging one hundred million dollars to battle AIDS in India. An important caveat to note, however, is that the giving of funds itself does not guarantee a successful result, and the field of philanthropy is becoming more and more cautious about unwise spending that produces little in the way of results.

These are large scale examples. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one exciting and apparently highly successful field of initiative is the microfinance of small business endeavors. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) operates village banking programs in 20 countries, offering startup capital and loans to poor clients, in particular women, who would otherwise be unable to start their own businesses (FINCA International, 2001). Here is one story:

“Sherida Mkama lives in Kamanga, Tanzania. Married, and the mother of 10 children, Sherida began selling tomatoes in 1995, starting her small business with only $10 in working capital. Although her produce sold well, she could never really afford to improve or expand her business. Sherida used her first FINCA loan to purchase spare parts for her bicycle, ‘so that transporting the tomatoes is simple and fast,’ she says. She has also cultivated her own tomato garden, and she says, ‘I can now easily afford seeds and insecticides for my tomatoes.’ But perhaps most important, she has been able to set aside savings, even after paying school and uniform fees for her children.”
This is but one success story of hundreds of thousands – FINCA’s clientele numbered more than 225,000 in 2002.

**Track Eight as Might be Applied to North Korea**

North Korea needs money and needs food. North Korea has attempted to generate cash through both illegal weapons sales and drug trafficking (CIA, 2004). The total requirement for food import was approximated at 484,000 tons of food in 2004 (World Food Program, 2004). Continuing drought conditions and an inefficient production and distribution system indicate the problem won’t be resolved anytime soon.

North Korea appears to be on the verge of opening market conditions to the point where the village banking microfinance concept could become a valuable tool. North Korea has already experimented with free economic zones, and has legalized farmer’s markets (Jones, 2004). These are positive indicators that the time may be approaching when agencies like FINCA may find their way into North Korea and make a profound impact.

**Track Nine Diplomacy: Communications and the Media**

**Track Nine Overview**

Diamond and McDonald state that “The primary task of the communications field is to use print, visual, and electronic media to inform and engage the public on issues relating to peace, conflict resolution, and international relations.” It may be more correct to say ‘relating to ALL issues’, thereby permitting the absorbing
public to freely choose peace if that is what is desired. They correctly point out that when there is media generation of news, there is a problem with media ‘spin’—slanting the news to fit a particular political viewpoint.

The solution to this is variety. Due to the date of the most recent revision of the book—1996—Diamond and McDonald did not consider the profound upcoming impact of the internet, which has, by its uncensored nature, saturated the electronic information world with myriads of viewpoints and choices. This variety will continue to grow over time, with the result being that slanted perspectives will be held in check by the sheer volume of alternate viewpoints.

Free and correct information is the greatest weapon of peacemakers. When one considers the geometric expansiveness of the internet just in the past few years, one is led to conclude that the future of diplomacy through information looks bright.

**Track Nine Success Stories**

Arguably the greatest success story of communication generating a diplomatic success would be Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The mission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is to promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating factual information and ideas (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2004). Beginning in 1949, Radio Free Europe began broadcasting information to countries behind the Iron Curtain, providing an alternate viewpoint of the world to that provided by Soviet Union official news agencies. The results were profound: when the Iron Curtain fell, the countries of Eastern Europe, without exception,
chose democratic forms of government to replace their Soviet-sponsored ones. In a speech to the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 2002, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus relates:

“For the last 27 years, the broadcasts of RFE have reached our country through its Lithuanian service. For around 15 years, our people who lived under Soviet censorship listened to news from the free world beamed by that particular radio. Each message from Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, or Vatican Radio contributed to breaking the blockade of information. Despite all jamming, these broadcasts were vitally accessible channels of objective information about the life of freedom, life in a democratic world. In most cases, this was the only source for Lithuanian people to learn about the real events that were silenced by the censors in their homeland. The word of truth has raised an entire generation of free-thinking people. No doubt, it helped Lithuania and other enslaved nations of Europe to independence and freedom. It’s needless to say it has significantly contributed to the creation and consolidation of democratic and open societies.”

This is powerful testimony to the impact of free information.

**Track Nine as Might be Applied to North Korea**

North Korea protects both its regime of leadership and way of life by enforcing a total communications blackout with the outside world. This will likely be unsupportable in the long term due to the inevitable encroachment by mobile telecommunications and the internet. China has been on the horns of a dilemma for some time: recognizing the need for economic reform, the government has permitted the internet and mobile telecommunication to enter
China. However, recognizing the danger to the political regime, China has attempted to censor the internet and prevent citizens from viewing unapproved websites. This strategy is doomed to failure, and Chinese leadership will increasingly face an informed citizenry which may demand political change which the present government might not welcome.

North Korea will one day most likely face the same dilemma. As previously related, the government already permits telecommunications firms to operate in the country. The government has recently begun sponsoring an official North Korean website, Naenara (Korea Computer Center in DPR Korea, 2003), although it is hosted on a foreign server and information flow is only one-way. Naenara is an interesting tool for understanding what the North Koreans believe about themselves, but at some time in the future the harsh light of reality will begin to be transmitted to the citizenry of North Korea, and political change will become inevitable.
Summary and Recommendations

What, then, would a true multi-track approach to peace with North Korea look like? Consider the following scenario:

Track One: Expanding on pre-announced military force reduction plans, the U.S. further announces a phased elimination of forces from South Korea, effectively removing the hostile force from the North Korean border.

Track Two: Expanding on prior works, the University of Missouri develops a program of agriculture reform that eliminates the possibility of future famine, and the Nautilus Institute expands its wind energy generation development program to villages throughout North Korea.

Track Three: Expanding on existing licenses to work in North Korea held by South Korean businesses, North Korea’s rich mineral reserves are developed into profitable manufacturing industries. The uniqueness of North Korea’s 1950-style communist infrastructure is developed into a popular tourist industry.

Track Four: Citizens from the world travel to North Korea as tourists and business people and depict the outside world as it really is—friendly, adventurous, and curious.

Track Five: Educational institutions develop and offer programs of scholarship for North Korean citizens. Scholars from the outside world respectfully study and publish balanced research on North Korean culture.
Track Six: Activists in the outside world, armed with the truth concerning the famine and the long-suffering impoverished North Korean people, work to remove the stigma that North Koreans are an evil people that must be suppressed.

Track Seven: Christian faith-based organizations respectfully partner with Confucian religious society to offer spiritual support to North Korean citizens as appropriate and opportunity presents.

Track Eight: Fully embracing the concept of peace through development, USAID, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others remove restrictions to dealing with North Korea, fully fund the aforementioned initiatives, and dedicate significant long term resources to the task of modernizing the North Korean economy.

Track Nine: At every opportunity, expand the access of satellite phone, internet, radio, and television into North Korea so that citizens may judge for themselves how they wish to view the world.

Admittedly, this does not resemble a peace plan. However, each of these activities depicts a facet of the heart and soul of the theory of multi-track diplomacy. When integrated as a system, the synergism of these efforts would far exceed the effectiveness of each individual component.
This peace plan calls for some significant change in policy by several governments and international agencies. These bodies, typically risk averse by nature, would be tempted to reject these ideas out of hand. But pause for a moment and examine each with a litmus test of these two questions:

*Are any of these initiatives counter to the interests of my organization?*

*What do I have to fear?*

One would believe that an honest, accurate, open-minded evaluation of these initiatives would yield a conclusion that they are singularly and collectively pretty innocuous overall, and that resistance would be based largely on fear of the unknown and untried. One would certainly also argue that an opportunity for peace and famine prevention deserves a braver response than that, particularly given that the potential for additional catastrophic suffering of North Korean citizens continues to exist with no light at the end of the tunnel.
References


The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy is a 501(c)3 non-profit organization incorporated in Arlington, VA. Founded in 1992 by Ambassador John W. McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond, the Institute is built on the premise that the power for peacemaking and peacebuilding resides in the many and not the few. IMTD is committed to the non-violent resolution of ethnic and regional conflict through training, education, and communication.

The Occasional Paper Series published by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy provides a forum for the exploration, identification, and discussion of the issues in conflict resolution theory and practice being confronted in the work of IMTD. Often based on the direct experiences of professionals working on IMTD projects, these discussions document some of the pioneering work being done in the field of conflict resolution.
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